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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR, and : 
DANESH RAHEMI, M.D., individuals and 
JEREZ, TAGHIPOUR AND ASSOCIATIONS, : 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, : Case No. 20010450-CA 
v. : 
EDGAR C. JEREZ, an individual, and : 
MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, DEAN : 
BECKER : 
Defendants and Appellees. : 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on August 14, 2001, and has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to §78-2-2, U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Was the Trial Court's decision dismissing the Appellants' Complaint 
for failure to state a claim for relief correct? Specifically, was Mt. Olympus 
completely insulated by §48-2b-127(2), U.C.A., from any due diligence 
requirements, under either tort or statutory law theories, to check out the 
legitimacy of the execution of a mortgage by the manager of a limited liability 
company who was specifically prohibited from making such a mortgage by the 
Operating Agreement of the limited liability company? This issue involves a 
question of statutory interpretation, for which the standard of review is 
correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, [^5, 31 P.3d 537, 538 (Utah 
2001). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
§48-2b-125,U.C.A.: 
(l)(b) If the management of the limited liability company is 
vested in the members, any member has authority to bind the 
limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement. 
(2)(b) If the management of the limited liability company is 
vested in a manager or managers, any manager has authority to 
bind the limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in 
the articles of organization or operating agreement. 
§48-2b-127,UJCA: 
(2) Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, 
mortgage or disposition of property of the limited liability 
company shall be valid and binding upon the limited liability 
company if they are executed by one or more managers of a 
limited liability company having a manager or managers or if 
they are executed by one or more members of a limited liability 
company in which management has been retained by the 
members. 
The provisions of Sections 125 and 127 were repealed as of May 1, 
2001. The new provisions on the same subject (which provide the protections 
being sought by Appellants through this action) are found in Section 48-2c-
802, U.C.A: 
2 
Agency authority of members and managers. 
* & •& 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager-
managed company: 
(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the 
purpose of its business; 
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the 
purpose of its business solely by reason of being a 
member; 
(c) an act of a manager, including the signing of a 
document in the company name, for apparently carrying 
on in the ordinary course of the company business, or 
business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the 
company unless the manager had no authority to act for 
the company in the particular matter and the lack of 
authority was expressly described in the articles of 
organization or the person with whom the manager was 
dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager 
lacked authority; and 
(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for 
carrying on in the ordinary course of the company 
business, or business of the kind carried on by the 
company, binds the company only if the act was 
authorized by the members in accordance with Subsection 
48-2c-803(2) or (3). 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and 
(2), unless the articles of organization expressly limit their 
authority, any member in a member-managed company, 
or any manager in a manager-managed company, may 
sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document transferring 
or affecting the company's interest in real or personal 
property, and if the authority is not so limited, the 
document shall be conclusive in favor of a person who 
gives value without knowledge of the lack of authority of 
the person who signs and delivers the document. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants are some of the individuals who formed a limited liability 
company ("the LC") and the LC itself1. The purpose of the LC was to 
purchase and develop a parcel of real estate under a joint venture agreement. 
The Articles of Organization of the LC listed Defendant Edgar Jerez as the 
manager of the LC. 
The Operating Agreement of the LC provided that no loan could be 
contracted on behalf of the LC without a resolution by the members. (See 
Appendix C.) Without obtaining the required approval and without the 
knowledge or consent of the other members of the LC, Jerez entered into a 
loan agreement on behalf of the LC with Appellee, Mt. Olympus. Jerez gave 
Mt. Olympus a Deed of Trust to the LC's property to secure a Trust Deed Note 
for $25,000.00. Other than apparently verifying that Jerez was the manager of 
the LC, Mt. Olympus did absolutely no due diligence of any kind to determine 
the propriety of Jerez's actions on behalf of the LC. 
Mt. Olympus disbursed to Jerez only $20,000.00 of the loan keeping 
$5,000 as an origination fee, points or some other financing inducement. Jerez 
pocketed the loan money for himself and then defaulted on the loan by failing 
to make any payments. The other members of the LC, including Appellants, 
never received any notices of the default or of the pending foreclosure sale -
4 
the notices went to Jerez. Appellants even continued to make payments on the 
promissory note to the underlying landowners of the property. 
Mt. Olympus foreclosed on the property. Even after the Mt. Olympus 
foreclosure, the Appellants made a payment on a promissory note to the 
underlying landowner of the property because they did not know of the 
foreclosure. Only after the redemption period for the foreclosure sale had 
expired did the Appellants learn that the property had been mortgaged by Jerez 
to obtain the loan. 
The Appellants filed an action in the Third District Court (R. 1-8), 
Appellees moved to dismiss (R. 15-19). The Trial Court granted the Motion 
(R. 59-61). A copy of the District Court's Memorandum Decision is attached 
as Appendix B. Appellants appealed the dismissal (R. 63-64). The Court of 
Appeals held that §48-2b-127(2) completely insulated Mt. Olympus from any 
due diligence requirements, under either tort or statutory law theories, to check 
out the legitimacy of the execution of a mortgage by the manager of a limited 
liability company who, in fact, was prohibited from making such a mortgage 
by the operating agreement. Taghipour v Jerez, 2001 UT App 139, ^|17, 26 
P.3d 885, 888 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
1
 All of these facts are found in the Appellant's Complaint (R. 1-8) and must be 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prior to the 2001 Legislative session, the Utah Limited Liability 
Company Act contained a conflict between two statutory sections regarding the 
authority of a manager of a limited liability company to bind the company if 
the articles of incorporation or operating agreement directed otherwise. One 
statutory section limited the ability of a manager to the authority stated in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement. The other section allowed any 
member or manager to bind a limited liability company for property 
transactions. This Court should construe the two sections of the Act in 
harmony and hold that the signature of the manger alone is insufficient to bind 
a limited liability company when the operating agreement of the company does 
not grant such powers to the manager. This Court should also recognize a 
common law duty requiring a party in a commercial loan setting to conduct at 
least minimal due diligence to determine the corporate authority of a manager 
or member under the articles of incorporation and/or the operating agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A PARTY IN A COMMERCIAL LOAN SETTING HAS A 
DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT TO DETERMINE 
THE CORPORATE AUTHORITY OF A MANAGER TO 
ENCUMBER THE ASSETS OF THE CORPORATION. 
taken as true. 
6 
Whether a lending institution, prior to the statutory codification of their 
duty by the Legislature in 2001, had a common law duty to verify that a 
manager of a limited liability company has the authority to bind the company 
is a case of first impression in Utah and, apparently, the United States. In 
looking at other types of Utah business entities it is clear that a person acting 
on behalf of the entity must have authority to do so. The same principle should 
apply to limited liability companies. 
In a case determining whether the law firm of a corporation was an 
agent of the corporation, the Court of Appeals stated that "[f]or example, no 
officer or agent of a corporation has authority to bind the firm in a real estate 
deal without a board resolution." Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McKonkie and 
Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 38, footnote 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Under Utah partnership law, where a general partner secured loans 
through a trust deed on a piece of property that the partnership owned without 
the knowledge of the limited partners, this Court held: 
Any person dealing with a partner can only rely on the partner's 
acts if they are within the ordinary and apparent scope of the 
partnership business. The burden of proof as to the partner's 
authority is on the party seeking to enforce the transaction. 
Luddington v. Bodenvest, Ltd. 855 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah 1993). (Citations 
omitted.) 
7 
If lenders dealing with corporate and partnership entities in Utah already 
are required to verify that an agent have actual or apparent authority to bind the 
entity, then requiring the same for the limited liability company entity is not an 
undue burden on a lender. "Common law concepts of agency apply with 
respect to LLC's to the same extent and in the same manner in which those 
principles apply with respect to any other legal person." Nicholas G. 
Karambelas, Limited Liability Companies, §5:07 (April 1999). When the 
potential for damage is so great, it is not an undue burden to require that 
finance companies exercise some rudimentary due diligence to determine the 
signature authority of the borrower. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTES IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THIS 
PROCEEDING WERE IN CONFLICT, AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN READ TO ACHIEVE A HARMONIOUS RESULT. 
The two statutes that were in effect at the time of this proceeding were 
in conflict. A manager's ability to "bind the limited liability company" is 
restricted if "otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating 
agreement" pursuant to§48-2b-125(2)(b), U.C.A. But §48-2b-127(2), U.C.A., 
pertaining only to documents providing for the mortgage of property, indicated 
that the documents "shall be valid and binding upon the limited liability 
company if they are executed by one or more managers." 
8 
A. The statutes should be read in harmony. 
The two statutes can and should be read in harmony with each other to 
prevent unjust results. 
Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language is the rule 
"that a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its provisions 
construed to be harmonious with each other and with the overall 
legislative objective of the statute." 
Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, 1999 Utah App. 342, Tfl7, footnote 7, 995 P.2d 
7, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), citing, Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 
265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
Such a harmonious reading here would require that a manager be 
properly authorized to bind the limited liability company in all situations, 
including signing for a mortgage or any other documents that may affect a 
property interest of the limited liability company. 
B. A statute with a more restrictive result should be read as the more 
specific provision. 
The Court of Appeals focused on the rule of statutory construction that a 
more specific statutory provision always takes precedence over a more general 
statutory provision. In doing so, the Court of Appeals ruled that the "specific 
requirements of section 48-2b-127(2) must control over the general application 
of section 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s restrictions." Jerez, supra at 888. Their 
reasoning was that the provision of §48-2b-127(2), U.C.A., applying to 
documents affecting the property interest of a limited liability company was 
9 
more specific than § 48-2b-127(2), U.C.A., restricting the rights of the 
manager to bind the limited liability company unless otherwise provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement. This Court should hold, 
instead, that the more specific clause is the more restrictive clause, which 
would require authority in all situations. 
In a case where there was a similar conflict between two statutes, one 
statute stated that the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) did not 
apply to state actions regarding the purchase or sale of real property, and 
another statute stated that the UAPA applied to any agency action of the Board 
and Division of State Lands, this Court found that the more specific clause was 
the one that applied the UAPA to any agency action of the Board and Division 
of State Lands. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 
1992). No reasoning was given stating why that clause was considered the 
more specific. However, in looking at the two clauses, it is apparent that the 
clause applying the Utah Administrative Procedure Act to any State Lands 
agency action was more restrictive and therefore more limiting. 
The same result should apply in this case. Just as Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance found that the more specific clause was the one that 
applied to any actions of the Board, this Court should find that the more 
specific clause is the one that applies to any actions of the manager of the 
limited liability company. 
10 
C. Legislative History also shows that the legislature intended the 
more restrictive result. 
In addition, legislative history shows that the legislature intended a more 
restrictive result, and wanted the authority of managers to be verified before 
binding the company in important decisions. When the Legislature first 
enacted the Utah Limited Liability Company Act in 1991, it allowed any 
manager to "have the authority to bind the limited liability company," without 
any restrictions about being authorized by the articles of incorporation or 
operating agreement. 1991 Laws of Utah 998. 
In 1992, the Legislature restricted the authority of the manager under 
§48-2b-125 by allowing them to bind the company "unless otherwise provided 
in the articles of organization." 1992 Laws of Utah 655, Sec. 8. In 1996, the 
authority of the manager was further restricted when the act was again 
amended to include "or operating agreement." 1996 Laws of Utah 577. This 
history shows the Legislature specifically added the section later limiting the 
power of the manager to allow them only to bind a company in situations 
where they were properly authorized. 
Further, the Legislature in 2001 recently rewrote the sections expressly 
limiting the power of the manager to only bind the company, even in real 
property situations, only if they are allowed to do so by the Articles of 
Incorporation. 2001 Laws of Utah Ch. 260, §62 codified as §48-2c-802, 
U.C.A. 
11 
Statutory construction principles state that: 
It is established practice in American legal processes to consider 
relevant information concerning the historical background of 
enactment in making decisions about how a statute is to be 
constructed and applied. This would be especially true when 
there is no case law directly on point, or the statutory language is 
inadequate or unclear. 
2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §48.03 (2000). 
As this is a case of first impression and the two provisions of the prior 
statute conflict, the intent of the Legislature manifested by the legislative 
history should be taken into consideration. The restrictions inserted throughout 
the years by the Legislature should be given weight in determining their intent. 
The documents listed in §48-2b-127 (e.g., mortgages) as binding on a limited 
liability company have the greatest potential for damage to a limited liability 
company because they are encumbering the property of the limited liability 
company. Therefore, these are the documents where it is imperative that the 
person signing the document be authorized to do so. Thus, in the event of a 
conflict between §48-2b-127, arguably binding the limited liability company to 
the wrongfully executed documents, and §48-2b-125, protecting the limited 
liability company from the unauthorized actions of its members, the intent of 
the Legislature to protect the limited liability company has now been 
established conclusively by the amendments to the Limited Liability Company 
Act enacted in 2001. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that, as with other business entities, there is a 
common law duty of due diligence requiring lending institutions to conduct at 
least minimal due diligence to determine the corporate authority of a manager 
or member under the Articles of Incorporation or Operating Agreement. This 
Court should read the two conflicting statutes in harmony, uphold the intent of 
the Legislature and give effect to the most restrictive statutory provision by 
limiting the power of a manager to bind a limited liability company if properly 
authorized to do so. This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals 
decision and the District Court's dismissal of this action and remand the matter 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this J day of October, 2001. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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EXHIBIT A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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Clerk of the Court 
Namvar Taghipour and Danesh 
Rahemi, M. D. , individuals; and 
Jerez, Taghipour, and 
Associates, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Edgar C. Jerez, an individual; 
and Mount Olympus Financial, 
L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000047-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 26 , 2001) 
2001 UT App 139 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Attorneys Bruce R. Baird and Dean H. Becker, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Blake S. Atkin and Jonathan Hawkins, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thome. 
THORNE, Judge: 
%1 Plaintiffs Namvar Taghipour, Danesh Rahemi, M.D., and Jerez, 
Taghipour and Associates, LLC, appeal from an order dismissing 
their claims against defendant Mt. Olympus Financial, L.C. (Mt. 
Olympus). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1J2 On August 30, 1994, Taghipour, Rahemi, and co-defendant 
Edgar Jerez (Jerez) formed Jerez, Taghipour and Associates, LLC 
(the LLC). The group formed the LLC to purchase and develop a 
parcel of real estate (the Property) under a joint venture 
agreement. The LLC's Articles of Organization listed Jerez as a 
LLC member and a manager, while its Operating Agreement provided 
that no loan could be contracted on behalf of the LLC without a 
resolution approved by its members. 
%3 On August 31, 1994, the LLC acquired the Property. On 
January 10, 1997, Jerez, unbeknownst to the LLC's other members 
or managers, unilaterally entered into a loan agreement for 
$25,000 with Mt. Olympus on behalf of the LLC. To secure the 
loan, Jerez executed and delivered a trust deed on the Property 
to Mt. Olympus. Subsequently, Mt. Olympus dispersed $20,000 of 
the funds to Jerez and kept the remaining $5,000 for various 
fees. Jerez apparently misappropriated the $20,000. The LLC, 
unaware of the loan, ultimately defaulted on it and Mt. Olympus 
foreclosed on the Property. 
1|4 On June 18, 1999, plaintiffs sued Mt. Olympus and Jerez, 
asserting claims against Mt. Olympus for: (1) declaratory 
judgment, (2) negligence, and (3) partition. In response, Mt. 
Olympus filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Mt. 
Olympus!s motion, ruling that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-
127(2) (1998), the documents executed by Jerez were binding upon 
the LLC. Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1[5 "The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) is a question of law; therefore we review the [trial] 
court's ruling for correctness." Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 
94,1(6, 987 P.2d 602. 
1|6 Plaintiffs argue the trial court's interpretation of section 
48-2b-127(2) was in error, because a manager cannot unilaterally 
bind a limited liability company when the company's operating 
agreement or articles of organization require a majority vote or 
a resolution before undertaking such an act. We review questions 
of statutory interpretation for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. See Adkins v. Uncle 
Bart' s . Inc . , 2000 UT 14,1(11, 1 P.3d 528. 
117 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred by ruling, as a 
matter of law, that Mt. Olympus had taken the steps necessary to 
determine Jerez was a LLC manager. We review a trial court's 
rulings of law for correctness. See Munford v. Lee Servicing 
Co. , 2000 UT App 108,1|10, 999 P.2d 23. 
1(8 Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by 
dismissing their partition claim against Mt. Olympus. This also 
presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. See 
id. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-127 
%9 Plaintiffs argue the Mt. Olympus loan agreement, unilaterally 
executed by Jerez on behalf of the LLC, is invalid because the 
LLC's Operating Agreement requires membership approval before 
such an undertaking. Plaintiffs assert that section 4 8-2b-
127(2), a Utah Limited Liability Act provision, requires such a 
result. 
UlO The rules of statutory construction require that we look 
"first to the plain language of a statute . . . and assume[] that 
each term was used advisedly by the [Legislature." Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,^14, 993 P.2d 875. Further, 
"it is well settled that a more specific [statutory] provision 
always takes precedence over a more general [statutory] 
provision." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); see also Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of 
State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1992). 
Ull In the present matter, plaintiffs argue that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 48-2b-125(2) (b) (1998) and Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-127(2) (1998) 
should be read in harmony, and therefore, section 4 8-2b-
125(2) (b) fs restrictions on manager authority should be 
incorporated into section 48-2b-127 (2) . In pertinent part, 
section 48-2b-125(2)(b) states: "If the management of the limited 
liability company is vested in a manager or managers, any manager 
has authority to bind the limited liability company, unless 
otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating 
agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) (emphasis 
added). In contrast, section 48-2b-127(2) states: "Instruments 
and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or 
disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be 
valid and binding upon the limited liability company if they are 
executed by one or more managers." Id. § 48-2b-127(2). 
Ul2 The plain language of section 48-2b-127(2) provides no 
limitations on a manager!s authority to execute specified 
instruments and documents, and thus, bind the limited liability 
company. Further, assuming, as we must, that "each term [in 
section 48-2b-127 (2)] was used advisedly by the [L] egislature," 
Biddle, 1999 UT 110 at 1|l4, we find no reason to suggest that had 
the Legislature intended section 48-2b-127(2) to include the same 
restrictions set forth in section 48-2b-125(2) (b), the 
Legislature would have omitted those restrictions. 
Hl3 Additionally, plaintiffs' argument ignores the well-
established rule of construction that specific statutory 
provisions prevail over general statutory provisions. See 
,, 966 P.2d at 277. Section 48-2b-127(2) states,, 
ain terms, " [instruments and documents . . • sHjifc 
and binding upon the limited liability company t$4 
:ed by one or more managers." Utah Code Ann. § *jfy 
(emphasis added) . Accordingly, the specific r««f;| 
:tion 48-2b-127 (2) must control over the general J 
stion 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s restrictions. 
Finally, we acknowledge plaintiffs1 concern thafc^  
ents listed in [section] 48-2b-127 have the gregtyl 
.tial for damage to a limited liability company fc^,1 
incumbering the property of the limited liability/ 
rer, 1![i]t is the power and responsibility of th»e f 
jislature to enact laws to promote the public he $d 
Ls, and general welfare of society . . . and [we^ 
-itute our judgment for that of the [L] egislaturr^, 
set to what best serves the public interest." E^Sft 
, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983); see also Redwocjyvs 
County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 113 8, 1141 (Utah 1981) |te 
is not the function of [appellate] court [s] to «eC|*^  
lorn or practical necessity of legislative enactm-^ it-t" 
lason, 94 Utah 501, 509, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (1938) fy-vj * 
judiciary "cannot supplant [the Legislature's] f 
own) . 
Furthermore, we can conceive of several reasom 
islature might choose not to expand the protections 
ckholders of a limited liability company in traWtf" 
olving the mortgage of real property. These re J* 
ilude the need to facilitate transactions involvifbh 
insfer of title to property and mortgages from t)A<£>; 
rties to new parties, and the limited access thes^, 
re to organic documents not revealed in a title / 
6 It is not necessary for our purpose, however
 M th , 
entify a specific basis for the Legislature's d ^ 
ther, all that is required is that we acknowledge^t :£o:r 
gislature's right to exercise its judgment. It iy cr>^ tV^ 8 
> evaluate, as plaintiffs would have us do, the 41 ^ Q t . ^ e 
igislature's choice in light of alternative c o u r ^ r - p ^ e t ° n ; 
;cordingly, we find no error in the trial court's1 ^ i o n 
: section 48-2b-127 (2) . 
B. Requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-J' 
17 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erredlaecess a s ^ 
tatter of law, that Mt. Olympus had taken the stefyrY<3L the^'y^ t o 
Letermine Jerez was a LLC manager. Plaintiffs co^ ^ ^ ^ ^°an 
tgreement was "invalid because [Mt.] Olympus fail*e sic^tio ^ r min^ 
:hat Jerez . . . did not have the power to take t^  U s he 
^ s 
did under the [LLC!s] Articles [of Organization] and Operating 
Agreement." Mt. Olympus, however, correctly concluded that Jerez 
was a manager of the LLC, and section 48-2b-127(2) requires 
nothing more. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined 
that Mt. Olympus took the steps necessary to determine Jerez was 
a manager of the LLC, and therefore, satisfied the requirements 
of section 48-2b-127 (2) . 
C. Partition 
118 Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by 
dismissing their claim for partition. After reviewing the trial 
memoranda of both parties, the trial court found section 48-2b-
127(2) dispositive and dismissed plaintiffs' claims.1 Following 
dismissal, the record in this matter lacks an objection or any 
other attempt by plaintiffs to obtain a specific ruling on their 
partition claim. "As a general rule, claims not raised before 
the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holcrate, 
2000 UT 74,!ll, 10 P. 3d 346. In addition, we note that 
plaintiffs' failure to establish that Jerez lacked the authority 
to bind the LLC also results in the failure of their partition 
claim. We therefore decline to reach the merits of plaintiffs' 
partition claim. 
119 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
William A. Thome, Jr. ,'" Judge 
120 I CONCUR: 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
121 I concur in the court!s opinion. In so doing, I must note 
that I find the policy reflected in sections 48-2b-125(2) (b) and 
-127(2) to be quite curious. If, as in this case, there are 
1. The trial court ruled that " [t]he [Mt. Olympus loan] 
documents executed by Mr. Jerez are valid and binding on the 
[LLC] . " 
restrictions in a limited liability company's organic documents 
on its managers' ability to unilaterally bind the company, those 
restrictions will be effective across the range of mundane and 
comparatively insignificant contracts purportedly entered into by 
the company, but the restrictions will be ineffective in the case 
of the company's most important contracts. Thus, if the articles 
of organization or operating agreement provide that the managers 
will enter into no contract without the approval of the company's 
members, as memorialized in an appropriate resolution, the 
company can escape an unauthorized contract for janitorial 
services, coffee supplies, or photocopying, but is stuck with the 
sale of its property for less than fair value or a loan on 
unfavorable terms. 
1)22 Surely this is at odds with the expectations of the business 
community. A manager or officer typically can bind the company 
to comparatively unimportant contracts, but, as is provided in 
the Operating Agreement in this case, needs member or board 
approval to borrow against company assets. Financial 
institutions know this and are able to protect themselves by 
insisting on seeing articles of incorporation, bylaws, and board 
resolutions--or the limited liability company equivalents--as 
part of the mortgage loan process. A cursory review of such 
documents in this case would have disclosed that Jerez lacked the 
authority to bind the company to the proposed loan agreement. 
H23 In short, I suspect that the strange result in this case is 
not so much the product of carefully weighed policy 
considerations as it is the product of a legislative oversight or 
lapse of some kind. That being said, I readily agree that the 
language of both statutory sections is clear and unambiguous and 
that it is not the prerogative of the courts to rewrite 
legislation. If the laws which dictate the result in this case 
need to be fixed, the repairs must come via legislative amendment 
rather than judicial pronouncement. 
Gregory K^C5rme, Judge 
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48-2c-802. Agency authority of members and managers. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a member-managed company: 
(a) each member is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business; 
(b) an act of a member, including the signing of a document in the company name, for apparently 
carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, 
binds the company, unless the member had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the 
lack of authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the member 
was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the member lacked authority; and 
(c) an act of a member which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary course of the company 
business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the company only if the act was authorized 
by the other members in accordance with Section 48-2c-803. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager-managed company: 
(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business; 
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its business solely by reason of being a 
member; 
(c) an act of a manager, including the signing of a document in the company name, for apparently 
carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, 
binds the company unless the manager had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the 
lack of authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the manager 
was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lacked authority; and 
(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary course of the company 
business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the company only if the act was authorized 
by the members in accordance with Subsection 48-2c-803(2) or (3). 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles of organization 
expressly limit their authority, any member in a member-managed company, or any manager in a manager-
managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document transferring or affecting the company's 
interest in real or personal property, and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in 
favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who signs and 
delivers the document. 
Enacted by Chapter 260,2001 General Session 
EXHIBIT B 
S 9 r - - ^ p ; i ' - t ; 
Blake S. Atkin #4466 
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C. 
136 South Main, Suite 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Mount Olympus Financial, L.C. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR and DANESH 
RAHEMI, M.D., individuals, and 
JEREZ TAGHIPOUR AND ASSOCIATES, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EDGAR C. JEREZ, an individual, 
and MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, 
L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS 
AGAINST DEFENDANT 
MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, LLC 
Civil No. 990906383 
Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss of Defendant Mt Olympus Financial, LLC on December 2, 
1999. Plaintiff was represented by Bruce R. Baird and Defendant 
was represented by Blake S. Atkin. The Court having considered the 
memoranda filed by the parties, and having heard the argument of 
counsel, rules as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated § 48-2b-127 states that instruments 
and documents providing for the mortgage of property of a limited 
liability company are valid and binding on the limited liability 
company if they are executed by the manager. 
The Complaint in this matter alleges that Edgar Jerez, 
who executed the documents in this case, was the manager of the 
L.C. 
THE COURT THEREFORE FINDS, as a matter of law, that Mt 
Olympus Financial performed all the due diligence necessary. The 
documents executed by Mr. Jerez are valid and binding on the L.C. 
Since all of Plaintiffs' claims are based on the 
allegation that the documents are not valid and binding because Mt 
Olympus Financial owed additional duties of due diligence, all of 
Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, all of Plaintiffs' claims against Mt Olympus 
Financial are dismissed with prejudice. 
THE COURT ALSO FINDS that there is no just reason for 
delay and expressly directs the entry of final judgment on 
Plaintiffs' claims against Mt Olympus Financial. 
DATED this IS *- day of December, 1999. 
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This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER 
DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT MT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, LLC 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this \ pcfay of December, 1999 to 
the following: 
Bruce R. Baird 
BAIRD & JONES, L.C. 
201 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
orddismi.jta 
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EXHIBIT C 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING AGREEMENT 
of 
JEREZ, TAGH1POUR and ASSOCIATES, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company 
ARTICLE! 
OFFICES 
1.1 Principal Office. The principal office of the Company in the State of Utah will be located 
at 3664 East 7650 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. The Company may have other offices, either 
within or without the state of Utah as the Members may designate or as the business of the 
Company may from time to time require. 
1.2 Registered Office. The registered office of the Company, required by the Utah Limited 
Liability Company Act to be maintained in the State of Utah, may, but need not, be identical with the 
Principal Office in the State of Utah. The address of the initial registered office of the Company is 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 309, Salt Lake City, Utah , and the initial registered agent at the address 
is Dean H. Becker. The registered office and the registered agent may be changed from time to time 
by action of the Members and by filing the prescribed form with the Utah Secretary of State. 
ARTICLE II. 
MEETINGS 
2.1 Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the Members will be held the first Tuesday in 
the month of January in each year, beginning with the year 1995 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m., 
for the purpose of retaining or replacing an Operating Manager and for the transaction of other 
business as may come before the meeting. If the day fixed for the annual meeting is a legal holiday, 
the meeting will held on the next succeeding business day. If the election is not held on the day 
designated in this Agreement for the annual meeting of the Members, or at any adjournment of the 
meeting, the Members will cause the election to be held at a special meeting of the Members as 
soon afterward as it may conveniently be held. 
2.2 Regular Meetings. The Members may prescribe the time and place for the holding of 
jular meetings and may provide that the adoption of the resolution will constitute notice of regular 
setings. If the Members do not prescribe the time and place for the holding of regular meetings, 
gular meetings will be held at the time and place specified by the Operating Manager in the notice 
each regular meeting. 
2.3 Special Meetings. Special meetings of the Members, for any purposes, unless otherwise 
escribed by statute, may be called by the Operating Manager or by any two Members. 
2.4 Notice of Meeting. Written notice stating the place, day and hour of the meeting and, 
case of a special meeting, the purposes for which the meeting is called, must be delivered not less 
tan three business days before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, by or at the 
irection of the Operating Manager, to each Member of record entitled to vote at the meeting. If 
lailed, the notice will be deemed to be delivered two days after deposit in the United States Mail, 
iddressed to the Member at his address as it appears on the books of the Company, with postage 
irepaid. When all the Members of the Company are present at any meeting, or if those not present 
»ign in writing a waiver of notice of the meeting, or subsequently ratify all the proceedings of the 
neeting, the transactions of the meeting are as valid as if a meeting were formally called and notice 
lad been given. 
2.5 Quorum. At any meeting of the Members, a majority of the equity interests, as 
determined from the capital contribution of each Member as reflected by the books of the Company, 
represented in person or by proxy, will constitute a quorum at a meeting of Members. If less than 
a majority of the equity interests are represented at a meeting, a majority of the interests so 
represented may adjourn the meeting from time to time without further notice. At an adjourned 
meeting at which a quorum is present or represented, any business may be transacted which might 
have been transacted at the meeting as originally notified. The Members present at a duly organized 
meeting may continue to transact business until adjournment, notwithstanding the withdrawal of 
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enough Members to leave less than a quorum. 
2.6 Proxies. At all meetings of Members, a Member may vote by proxy executed in writing 
by the Member or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact. The proxy must be filed with the Operating 
Manager of the Company before or at the time of the meeting. No proxy shall be valid after three 
months from date of execution. 
2.7 Voting by Certain Members. Management Certificates standing in the name of a 
corporation, partnership or company may be voted by an officer, partner, agent or proxy as the 
Bylaws of the entity prescribe or, in the absence of such provision, as the president or managing 
partner of the entity may determine. Certificates held by a trustee, personal representative, 
administrator, executor, guardian or conservator may be voted by such person, either in person or 
by proxy, without a transfer of the certificates into the person's name. 
2.8 Manner of Acting: 
2.8.1 Formal action by Members. The act of 5 1 % of the ownership interests will be the act 
of the Members. Voting on a particular issue may be in accordance with percentage of equity 
ownership in the company. 
2.8.2 Procedure. The Operating Manager of the Company will preside at meetings of the 
Members, may move or second any item of business and may vote his ownership interest. The 
voting will be in accordance with the percentage of equity ownership in the company. A record must 
be maintained of the meetings of the Members. The Members may adopt their own rules of 
procedure which may not be inconsistent with this Operating Agreement. 
2.8.3 Presumption of Assent. A Member of the Company who is present at a meeting of the 
Members at which action on any matter is taken will be presumed to have assented to the action 
taken, unless the Member's dissent is entered in the minutes of the meeting or unless the Member, 
files a written dissent to the action with the person acting as the secretary of the meeting before the 
adjournment of the meeting or forwards the notice of dissent by certified mail to the secretary of the 
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neeting immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. The right to dissent will not apply to a 
Member who voted in favor of the action. 
2.8 4 Informal Action of Members. Unless otherwise provided by law, any action required 
o be taken at a meeting of the Members, or any other action which may be taken at a meeting of 
he Members, may be taken without a meeting if a consent is in writing, setting forth the action so 
aken and is signed by all the Members entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter of the 
neeting.. 
2.9 Order of Business. The order of business at all meetings of the Members will be as 
follows: 
1. Roll Call. 
2. Proof of notice of meeting or waiver of notice. 
3. Reading of minutes of preceding meeting. 
4. Report of the Operating Manager. 
5. Reports of Committees. 
6. Unfinished Business. 
7. New Business. 
2.9 Telephonic Meeting. Members of the Company may participate in any meeting of the 
Members by means of conference telephone or similar communication if all persons participating in 
a meeting can hear one another for the entire discussion of the matters. Participating in a meeting 
pursuant to this Section will constitute presence in person at the meeting. 
ARTICLE III 
FISCAL MATTERS 
3.1 Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Limited Liability Company will begin on the first day 
of January and end on the last day of December each year, unless otherwise determined by 
resolution of the Members. 
3.2 Deposits. All funds of the Limited Liability Company will be deposited from time to time 
to the credit of the Limited Liability Company in the banks, trust companies or other depositories as 
the Members select. 
3.3 Checks, Drafts, Etc. All checks drafts or other orders for the payment of money, and all 
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notes or other evidences of indebtedness issued in the name of the Company will be signed by the 
Operating Manager. 
3.4 Loans. No loans may be contracted on behalf of the Limited Liability Company or no 
evidences of indebtedness may be issued in its name unless authorized by a resolution of the 
Members. The authority may be general or confined to specific instances. 
3.5 Contracts. The Members may authorize any Member or agent of the Company, in 
addition to the Operating Manager, to enter into any contract or execute any instrument in the name 
of and on behalf of the Company, and the authority may be general or confined to specific instances. 
3.6 Accountant. An accountant may be selected from time to time by the Members to 
perform the tax and accounting services as required. The accountant may be removed by the 
Members without assigning any cause for removal. 
3.7 Legal Counsel. One or more Attorneys at Law may be selected from time to time by the 
Members to review the legal affairs of the Company and to perform other services as may be 
required and to report to the Members with respect to those services. Legal Counsel may be 
removed by the Members without assigning any cause for removal. 
ARTICLE IV. 
OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES AND THEIR TRANSFER 
4.1 Certificates. Ownership Certificates representing equity interests in the Company shall 
be in a form determined by the Members. Certificates must be signed by the Operating Manager 
and one other Member as assigned by a vote of the Members. All Certificates must be consecutively 
numbered or otherwise identified. The name and address of the person to whom the Certificates 
are issued, along with the persons's capital contribution, shall be entered on the Certificate. 
4.2 Certificate Register. Any and all changes in Members or their amount of capital 
contribution must be noted on the books of the company. 
4.3 Transfers of Shares. Any Member proposing a transfer or assignment of his Certificate 
must first notify the Company, in writing, of all the details and consideration for the proposed transfer 
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assignment. The company, for the benefit of the remaining Members, shall have the first right to 
-quire the equity by cancellation of the Certificate under the same terms and conditions presented 
r
 the departing Member to the third party. The election to purchase such interest must be 
:ercised by the Company within thirty days of the initial presentation of the offer. 
If the company declines to elect the option to purchase the assets, the remaining Members 
ho desire to participate may proportionately (or in the proportions as the remaining Members may 
jree) purchase the interest under the same terms and conditions first proposed by the withdrawing 
lember. 
if !he transfer or assignment is made as originally proposed and the other Members fail to 
pprove the transfer or assignment by unanimous written consent, the transferee or assignee will 
ave no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the Limited Liability 
Company or to become a Member. The transferee or assignee will only be entitled to receive the 
hare of the profit or other compensation by way of income and the return of contributions to which 
hat Member would otherwise be entitled. 
ARTICLE V. 
BOOKS AND RECORDS 
5.1 Books and Records. The books and records of the company must be kept at the 
Drincipal office of the company or at other places, within or without the state of Utah, as the Members 
rrom time to time determine. 
5.2 Right of Inspection. Any Member of record will have the right to examine and make 
copies, at any reasonable time or times for all purposes, the books and records of account, minutes 
and records of Members. The inspection may be made by any agent or attorney of the Member. 
On the written request of any Member, the Company must mail to such Member its most recent 
financial statements, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the results of its 
operations. 
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5.3 Financial Records. All financial records will be maintained and reported based upon 
generally acceptable accounting practices. 
ARTICLE VI. 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 
The Members may from time to time unanimously declare, and the company may distribute, 
accumulated profits agreed not necessary for the cash needs of the company's business. In the 
event that any Member believes that profits are being unnecessarily retained, the Member shall be 
entitled to call a special meeting for the sole purpose of determining the prudence of distributing the 
profits in a manner other than that directed by the Manager. The special meeting referred to in this 
Article shall not be controlled by the provisions of Section 2.3 above, for such special meeting may 
be called by any one member. All other provisions regarding voting and notice shall apply to this 
Article. 
OFFICERS 
7.1 Operating Manager. The Operating Manager will be the chief executive officer of the 
Company responsible for the general overall supervision of the business and affairs of the Company. 
When present, the manager will preside at all meetings of the Members. The Operating Manager 
may sign, on behalf of the Company, deeds, mortgages, bonds, contracts or other instruments which 
have been appropriately authorized to be executed by the Members except in cases where the 
signing or execution is expressly delegated by the Members or by this Operating agreement or by 
statute to some other Officer or Agent of the company; and, in general, shall perform all duties as 
may be prescribed by the Board from time to time. 
The specific authority and responsibility of the Operating manager will also include the 
following: 
1. The Operating Manager will effectuate this Operating Agreement and the 
Regulations and decisions of the Members. 
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2. The Operating Manager will direct and supervise the operations of the Company. 
3. The Operating Manager, within parameters as may be set by the Members, will 
establish charges for services and products of the Limited liability Company as may 
be necessary to provide adequate income for the efficient operation of the Company. 
4. The Operating Manager, within the budget established by the Members, will set 
and adjust wages and rates of pay for all personnel of the Company and will appoint, 
hire and dismiss all personnel and regulate their hours of work. 
5. The Operating Manager will keep the Members advised in all matters pertaining 
to the operation of the Company, sen/ices rendered, operating income and expense, 
financial position, and, to this end, will prepare and submit a report to the Members 
at each regular meeting and at other times as may be directed by the Members. 
7.2 Other Officers. The Company, at the discretion of the Members, may have additional 
)fficers including, without limitation, one or more Vice-Operating Managers, one or more Secretaries 
md one or more Treasurers. Officers need not be selected from among the Members. One person 
nay hold two or more offices, except one person may not hold both the office of Operating Manager 
and the office of Secretary. When the incumbent of an office, as determined by the incumbent 
limself or by the Members, is unable to perform the duties of his office, or when there is no 
ncumbent of an office (both such situations referred to below as the "absence" of the Officer), the 
duties of the office shall be performed by the person specified by the Members. 
7.3 Election and Tenure. The Officers of the Company will be elected annually by the 
Members at the annual meeting. Each Officer will hold office from the date of his election until the 
next annual meeting and until his successor has been elected, unless the officer sooner resigns or 
is removed. 
7.4 Resignations and Removal. Any Officer may resign at any time by giving written notice 
to the Operating Manager or to all of the Members and, unless otherwise specified, the acceptance 
of the resignation will not be necessary to make it effective. Any Officer may be removed at any time 
by the Members with or without cause unless removal without cause violates state or federal law 
regarding the termination of employment or is solely based upon the officer's race, gender, religion 
or age 
7.5 Vacancies. A vacancy in any office may be filled for the unexpired portion of the term by 
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the Members. 
7.6 Salaries. The salaries of the officers will be fixed from time to time by the Members and 
no officer may be prevented from receiving such salary by reason of the fact that he is also a 
Member of the Company. 
ARTICLE VIII. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
8.1 Notice. Any notice required or permitted to be given pursuant to the provisions of 
statute, the Articles of Organization of the Limited Lability Company, this Operating Agreement will 
be effective as of the date personally delivered or, if sent by mail, two days from the date deposited 
with the United States Postal Service, prepaid and addressed to the intended receiver at the 
receiver's last known address as shown in the records of the Limited Liability Company. 
8.2 Waiver of Notice. Whenever any notice is required to be given pursuant to the 
provisions of the Statute, the Articles of Organization of the Limited Liability Company or this 
Operating Agreement, a waiver of the notice, in writing, signed by the persons entitled to notice, 
whether before or after the time stated, will be deemed equivalent to the giving of the notice. 
8.3 Indemnification by Company. The Limited Liability Company may indemnify any person 
who was or is a party defendant to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, 
whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the 
Limited Liability Company) by reason of the fact that such person is or was a Member of the 
Company, Officer, employee or agent of the Company, or is or was serving at the request of the 
Company, against expenses (including attorney's fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in 
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by the person in connection with the action, suit or 
proceeding if the Members determine that the person acted in good faith and in a manner 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the Limited Liability Company, and 
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, has no reasonable cause to believe the conduct 
was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit, or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, 
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>nviCt:onl or on a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, will not in itself create a presumption 
at the person did or did not act in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best 
terest of the Limited Liability Company. 
8 4 Indemnification Funding. The Company will fund the indemnification obligations provided 
/ Section 8.3 in the manner and to the extent the Members may fiom time to time deem proper. 
8.5 Duality of InterestTransactions. Members of this Company have a duty of undivided 
lyalty to this Company in all matters affecting this Company's interest. 
8.6 Anticipated Transactions. Notwithstanding the provision of Section 8.5, it as anticipated 
lat the Members and Officers will have other legal and financial relationships. Representatives of 
lis Company, along with representatives of other entities, from time to time may participate in the 
Dint development of contracts and transactions designed to be fair and reasonable to each 
>articipant and to afford an aggregate benefit to all participants. Therefore, it is anticipated that this 
Company will desire the participation of the Company in these contracts and transactions may be 
authorized by the Members. 
8.7 Gender and Number. Whenever the context requires, the gender of all words used in 
his Agreement will include the masculine, feminine and neuter, and the number of all words will 
nclude the singular and plural. 
8.8 Articles and other Headings. The Articles and other headings contained in this Operating 
Agreement are for reference purposes only and will not affect the meaning or interpretation. 
8.9 Reimbursement of Officers and Members. Officers and Members will receive 
reimbursement for expenses reasonable incurred in the performance of their duties. 
8.10 Referral to Joint Venture Agreement. The terms and conditions of that certain Joint 
Venture Agreement signed on the day of August, 1994 between Edgar C. Jerez, Namvar 
Taghipour, Orlando Jerez, Paul A. Bruno, Ksai Liang and Maretta Wrigley are adopted and 
incorporated into the terms of this Operating Agreement. In the event that there exists any conflict 
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between the terms of this Operating Agreement and the Joint Venture Agreement, the terms of this 
Operating Agreement control. 
ARTICLE IX. 
AMENDMENTS 
9.0 Amendments. This Operating Agreement may be altered, amended, restated, or 
repealed and a new Operating Agreement may be adopted by three-fourths action of all ownership 
interests, after notice and opportunity for discussion of the proposed alteration, amendment, 
restatement, or repeal. CERTIFICATION 
THE UNDERSIGNED, being all of the Members of Jerez, Taghipour and Associates,, LLC 
a Utah Limited Liability Company, evidence their adoption and ratification of the foregoing Operating 
Agreement of the Company. 
EXECUTED by each Member on the Date indicated. 
EDGAR C. JEREZ NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR 
Date: Date: 
KSAI LIANG 
Date: 
MARETTA WRIGLEY 
Date: 
PAUL A. BRUNO 
Date: 
Date: L > M l 
ORLANDO JEREZ 
Date: 
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EXHIBIT D 
CERTIFICATION OF TO AN PURPOSE 
The undersigned, being the Borrowers pursuant to loan transaction dated 
///Off^ and in the amount of ^ P ) fl2Q^~ and secured with 
property located at 3<P<fl/ <£. 63QJ S. \ ^ £ JUZ^ K ^ ( ^ i 
in *^c&£f <Ldfcg County, State of Utah, with Mt Ofympus Financial, LC, its 
successors and/or assigns, as Lender, hereby represent, warrant and certify as follows: 
1. The representations, covenants and agreements contained herein and/or in the 
loan application are made to induce Mt Olympus Financial, LC to make a business 
purpose loan to the undersigned, primarily secured by certain property referred to above, 
with full knowledge and intent that such representations, covenants and agreements be 
relied upon. 
2. The undersigned hereby represent and certify that the loan applied for is solely 
for business purposes and will not be used for personal, family or household purposes or 
for consumer credit purposes (as that term is defined by the Utah Consumer Credit Code, 
the Truth-in-Lending Act and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and 
regulations promulgated thereunder). 
3. The undersigned covenant and agree to indemnify and hold harmless MT 
OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, LC, its successors and/or assigns, for any loss, damage or 
penalty, including attorney's fees, which may occur if the representations contained 
herein are found to be false. 
I have read each of the above paragraphs and understand their 
meaning and importance. I also understand that I am free to have 
this transaction and all its documents reviewed by my own attorney 
before signing. 
Borrower Date 
